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ADVERSE POSSESSION-TTLE BY INNOCENT MISTAKEN OccupATioN.-The plain-
tiff and defendant were adjoining landowners. The plaintiff mistakenly occupied
a strip of the defendant's land for more than the statutory period under
the belief that it was part of his tract. He disclaimed the intention of wanting
any land that did not belong to him. The plaintiff sued to quiet title. The
court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff had occupied the disputed strip by
mistake, but without intending to claim beyond the true line, such occupation
woud not be adverse possession. Held, that the instruction was erroneous.
Dawson v. Abbott (1922, N. C.) 114 S. E. 15.
The case is in accord with the better rule, that possession for more than the
statutory period under a claim of title is sufficient to make the holding adverse,
regardless of the intention of the claimant. See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 195; (922) 31 ibid. 450; Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse
Possession (IIS) 28 ibid. 219, 223.
BILLS AND NoTEs-FRA.uD--REAcQUIsiTIoN BY HOLDER WITH NOTICE AFTER
INDORSEMENT TO AN INNOCENT INDORsEE.-The plaintiff purchased notes of the
defendant with knowledge of the fact that they had been procured by fraud.
He then transferred them to a purchaser for value without notice. Subsequently
he repurchased them and brought this action to recover the balance due. Held,
that the plaintiff could not recover against the maker. Pierce v. Carlton (1922,
N. C.) 114 S. E. 13.
The court wisely construed the words, "and who is not himself a party to
any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument," as applicable to the plaintiff.
Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. 58; Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments
Law Annotated (3d ed. 1919) 207; Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments of
the Negotiable Instruments Law (1913) 26 HARv. L. Rnv. 493, 503; Chafee,
The Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party (1921) 21 COL.
L. REV. 538; contra, Horan v. Mason (191o) 141 App. Div. 89, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 668.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--NATURALIZATION-JAPANESE EXCLUDED FROM CITIZEN-
sHI.-The plaintiff, a Japanese, having the necessary residential and educa-
tional qualifications, sought citizenship. The questions were whether section 2169
of the Revised Statutes, restricting naturalization to aliens who were free white
persons, was incorporated into the Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat. at L. 596),
and, if so, whether a Japanese was eligible to citizenship. Held, that section
2169 was a part of the Act of June 29, 19o6, and that consequently a Japanese
was not eligible to citizenship. Osawa v. United States (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup.
CL 65.
The plaintiffs, two Japanese, were issued certificates of naturalization prior
to 19o6 by the Superior Court of Washington. They sought a mandamus to
compel the Secretary of State of Washington to permit them to incorporate, his
refusal being on the ground that not being eligible to citizenship they were not
qualified under the laws of Washington to be incorporators. Held, that since,
on the authority of the preceding case, the plaintiff were not entitled to naturali-
zation, the judgment of the Superior Court was void. Yamashita v. Hincle
(1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 69.
Although the two instant cases are legally sound, yet there has been much
discussion as to the wisdom of the policy involved. One view is that either
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Japanese immigration should be definitely prohibited, or permission to settle
here should be accompanied by the privilege of becoming a citizen. According
to the other opinion, the law which prevents the naturalization of Japanese is
intended to exclude them because they are racially unassimilable and their pres-
ence creates economic difficulties. "Free white persons" has been construed to
mean and include people of the Caucasian race. In re Charr (1921, W. D. Mo.)
273 Fed. 2o7; In re Singh (1919, S. D. Calif.) 257 Fed. 209 (high caste Hindoo) ;
United States v. Balsara (igio, C. C. A. 2d) i8o Fed. 694 (Parsee); Dow v.
United States (915, C. C. A. 4th) 226 Fed. 145 (Syrian); In re Halladjian
(igo9, Mass.) 174 Fed. 834 (Armenian); In re Rodriguez (1897, W. D. Tex.)
81 Fed. 337 (Mexican).
CoNsTTuTIorAL LAw-PoLIcE POWER-UNUSTIFIABLE EXTENSION.-The de-
fendant anthracite coal company conveyed the surface of land to the plaintiffs
in 1878, reserving the right to reniove the coal under it. The plaintiffs agreed
to take all risks and waive any claims for damages from such mining. The
Kohler Act (Pa. Laws, 1921, No. 445) forbade the mining of anthracite coal in
such a way as to cause subsidence. In a bill for an injunction the defendant
claimed that the obligation of contract was impaired, and that his property was
being taken for an insufficient public interest without compensation. Held, (one
Justice dissenting) that the injunction should not be issued. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 158.
Again the articulate social policy of a legislature is defeated by the "inarticu-
late major premise" of the courts. See Holmes Path of the Law (1897) 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 467; CoMaENrs (1922) 31 YALE LAW JotnuRAI, 310, 314.
In view of the minority opinion in the instant case and the majority opinion in
the state court, there would seem to be ample precedent to support this statute.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922, Pa.) 118 At. 491; (1922) 71 U. PA. L.
REV. 77. The decision may be another indication of a recent tendency to narrow
the scope of legislative power, which is perhaps to be expected after the extended
emergency limits of war time.
CoNTRACrs-SMENCE AS ACCEPTANCE-USAGE OF TRADE.-The defendant's trav-
eling salesman solicited and obtained two orders from the plaintiff. The defendant
filled the first but refused to ship the goods in the second order on the ground
that he had never accepted it. In an action for breach of contract, the trial
court refused to admit evidence to show a usage of the trade which required the
rejection of offers within ten days if they were not accepted. Held, that the
evidence should have been admitted. May Co. v. Menzies Shoe Co. (1922, N. C.)
113 S. E. 593.
The rule that silence is never acceptance is true only when unaccompanied
by peculiar circumstances which may create a duty in the offeree to speak. Such
peculiar circumstances may be the course of dealing; express agreement to so
construe silence; or, as in the instant case, usage of trade. Hobbs v. Massasoit
Whip Co. (1893) i58 Mass. 194, 33 N. E. 495; House v. Beak (1892) 141 Ill.
29o, 3o N. E. io65; see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoT RNAL, 561.
CRimilAL LAw-CoxsPnRAcY-SUBsTITuTIo OF PRsoRt -The defendant,
pursuant to an agreement with a prisoner on bail, presented himself at the
workhouse and served the latter's term. Held, that this was a conspiracy.
Biskind v. United States (1922, C. C. A. 6th) 281 Fed. 47.
The instant case is novel on its facts, but is justified by analogies. Davis v.
United States (19Ol, C. C. A. 6th) lO7 Fed. 753 (resisting expected arrest);
Drew v. Thaw (1914) 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137 (withdrawing inmate from
asylum) ; Ex parte Lyman (1913, D. C.) 2o2 Fed. 303 (bribing guard to permit
escape from prison).
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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEED-
INGs.-The defendant, an involuntary bankrupt, refused to file schedules of
his property on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him. Held, that
since there was no reasonable ground to apprehend self-incrimination the bank-
rupt should file the schedule. Matter of Arend (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 68 N. Y. L.
JOUR. I.
The privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed in bankruptcy as well
as in any other action. Podolin v. Dry Goods Co. (1914, C. C. A. 3d) 21o
Fed. 97. Originally the witness himself was the sole judge in determining
whether his answer would incriminate him. Fisher v. Ronalds (1852) 12 C. B.
761; Er parte Gauss (1909) 223 MO. 277, 122 S. W. 741. But the general rule,
now, is that for a witness to claim his privilege it must appear that there is
some possibility of self-incrimination as a result of his answer. Reginm v.
Boyes (1861, Q. B.) I Best & S. 311; Mason v. United States (1917) 244 U. S.
362, 37 Sup. Ct. 621. The question is thus resolved into one of burden of proof.
State v. Thaden (i8go) 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447; 4 Wigmore, Evidence
(1905) 3137.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIMONY WITHOUT SEPARATE MAINTENANCE OR
DIvoRCE.-The plaintiff was drawing a pension as widow of a Civil War veteran
during a period of six years while she and the defendant were holding themselves
out as man and wife. She then filed a bill to have this common-law marriage
affirmed under Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, ch. 217, sec. 11395, and in the same
action asked for alimony. Held, that the evidence did not establish a common-
law marriage, and hence the bill must be dismissed. Lockwood v. Lockwood
(1922, Mich.) 189 N. W. 871.
By statute in Michigan, a wife may sue for alimony without also suing for
divorce or separate maintenance. Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, ch. 218, sec. 11479;
Meyerl v. Meyerl (19Ol) 125 Mich. 6o7, 84 N. W. iio9.. A valid marriage is
necessary, however, before such relief can be given. Clancy v. Clancy (1887)
66 Mich. 202, 33 N. W. 889. As to her right to sue in other jurisdictions there
is a sharp conflict. See Hagert v. Hagert (1911) 22 N. D. 290, 133 N. W. 1035;
NoTEs AND COMMENT (1912) i0 MICE. L. REV. 403.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-STATE COURTS MAY ENFORCE NATIONAL PROHIBITTON
AcT.-The plaintiff brought a civil action in a state court to recover damages
under the National Prohibition Act because intoxicating liquor was unlawfully
sold to her husband. Held, that she could recover. Sinithers v. Brunkhorst
(1922, Wis.) 19o N. W. 349.
This decision seems to be the first directly on the point. It rests upon the
accepted rule that where an Act of Congress creates a right which is not exclu-
sively confined to the jurisdiction of federal courts, such right may be enforced
in a state court See Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley (1921) 175 Wis.
565, 185 N. W. 218.
LEGAL ETHics-PRACTICE OF LAW By CORPORATIo.-The defendant corpora-
tion, for a stipulated yearly fee, agreed, inter alia, to furnish its patrons with all
necessary legal advice to assist in the collection of their accounts, and to defend
them in all actions brought against them in police and justice courts. It employed
duly licensed attorneys to render these legal services. Held, that the contract
was illegal. Calif. Const. art. 6, sec. 22; Calif. Code Civ. Procedure, 1915, secs.
171, 281, 1209. People, ex rel. Lawyers' Inrstitute of San Diego, v. Merchants'
Protective Corp. (1922, Calif.) 209 Pac. 363.
In spite of incontrovertible authority corporations will doubtless further persist
in trying to practice law. The practice of law is not confined to the prosecution
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of suits in court, but includes the drafting of all legal papers. State v. Mer-
chants' Protective Corp. (1gig) lO5 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694; Midland Credit
Adjustment Co. v. Donnelly (192o) 219 Ill. App. 271; People v. People's Trust
Co. (917) i8o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767; (1918) is CoL. L. REv. 276;(1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 461; CURRENT LEGISLATION (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 78.
Some legal or quasi-legal services a corporation is undoubtedly privileged to
render its customers; but the cases tend increasingly to limit such activity, as
one or another attempted evasion of the previous decisions comes before the
courts.
PL. ING--INTEBPiLDER-NOT GRANTE UNLESS SUITS WOULD BE MUTUALLY
Excnusir.-The plaintiff deposited with the defendant bank a check drawn
upon the X Bank. Upon notification from the X Bank that it had been credited
with the amount of the check, the defendant notified the plaintiff that the deposit
was subject to his order. Upon subsequent notification that the check was not
good, the defendant charged it back to the plaintiff's account and, in clearing
with the X Bank, refused to give credit to the latter. The plaintiff sued for the
amount of the check, and the defendant sought to interplead the plaintiff and
the X Bank. Held, that the interpleader should not be granted, since a suit by
the X Bank would not be upon the same debt or duty as the present suit.
Grahaim v. Nat. Bank of Smyrna (1922, Del. Super. Ct.) 118 Atd. 325.
Notice by a bank upon which a check is drawn, to a bank with which it is
deposited, that the amount of the check is credited to the latter's account generally
amounts to payment thereof and the establishment of an irrevocable book credit.
Cohen v. First Nat. Bank of Nogales (1921, Ariz.) 198 Pac. 122; NOTES (1921)
21 COL. L. REv. So5; (1921) 31 YALE LA W JOURNAL, 95; Security Nat. Bank v.
Old Nat. Bank (1917, C. C. A. 8th) 241 Fed. I. This is not so when there is
merely notice of receipt. However, even in that case undue delay in giving
notice of dishonor discharges the indorser-depositor and prevents either cancella-
tion of the original credit entry or set-off of the amount of the dishonored
check against the original credit. Swift & Co. v. Miller (I916) 62 Ind. App.
312, 113" N. E. 447. Since the plaintiff and the X Bank each had a cause of
action against the defendant in the instant case, the interpleader was properly
denied. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (192) 30 YALE LANW JoURNAL, 814;
cf. Alton & Peters v. Merritt (Ig2o) 145 Minn. 426, 177 N. W. 77o.
STATUTEs-INTERPRETATio.-To an indictment under the Act of Oct. 23, igi8(4o Stat at L. loi5) for a conspiracy to obtain payment of a false and fraudulent
claim against the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation,
the defense was that since the statute contained no reference as to the limits
of its territorial jurisdiction, it must be construed not to extend to acts com-
mitted on the high seas. Held, that this was no defense. United States v.
Bownan (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct 39.
This case seems to be a proper relaxation of the general rule that penal
statutes must be strictly construed. United States v. Corbett (1909) 215 U. S.
233, 30 Sup. Ct. 8I; Bruncken, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25
YAL LAW JOURNAL, 129; (I919) 28 ibid. 616; (I918) 28 ibid. 97; (1920) 20
Co. L. REV. 345; (1916) 16 ibid. 264; (1917) 20 LAw NoTES, 184; (1915)
I VA. L. REa. (N. s.) 512.
TRIAL PRACTIcE-GENERAL Vmnicr SUPPORTED BY ONE GOOD COUNT STANDS.-
The plaintiff was injured by flying debris resulting from the use of dynamite by
the defendants. Suit was brought upon two counts: one for common law
negligence, and the other for using an agency intrinsically dangerous under the
circumstances. The court instructed the jury correctly on the first point, but
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incorrectly and in favor of the plaintiff on the second count. There was a general
verdict for the plaintiff. Held, that the general verdict should stand since it
might be sustained on one of the counts. Worth v. Dunn (1922) 98 Conn. 51,
118 Atl. 467.
This point is in conflict. Accord: Crossett v. Whelan (1872) 44 Calif. 200;
Bays v. Herring (1879) 51 Iowa, 286, I N. W. 558; Aaronson v. City of New
Haven (1920) 94 Conn. 69o, n1o Atl. 872; contra: Lichtenstein v. Belknap (1917,
Sup. C.) 165 N. Y. Supp. 936; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Zeitz (1917) 64
Colo. 87, 17o Pac. I81. See Wladyka v. City of Waterbury (1922, Conn.) ii9
Atl. 149. For a general discussion, see (192o) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 197.
UNFAIR COMPETITIoN-CREATION oF M NOPOLY-CoNTRAcTS IN RESTRAINT OF
TA ADF-The Federal Trade Commission pursuant to its powers to prevent unfair
competition under the Act of September 26, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 717), ordered
the respondent to desist from entering into contracts prohibiting wholesalers
from handling competitive publications, on the ground that such contracts
violated the Clayton Act, Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 73o, 731). Held,
(two judges doubting), that the order should be set aside. Federal Trade Comm.
v. Curtis Pub. Co. (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 210.
The defendants, formerly competing bill posters, organized an incorporated
association to monopolize and control all trade and commerce in bill posting in
the United States and Canada. The plaintiffs, solicitors of advertising not
members of the defendants' organization, as a result of the defendants' acts,
were disabled from competing in the markets. They sued for treble damages
under the Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 189o (26 Stat at L. 209, 21o). The com-
plaint was dismissed. Held, that the judgment should be reversed. Ramsay v.
Associated Bill Posters of the United States and Canada (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup.
Ct. 167.
The cases are reconcilable on their facts. In the first case the Court found
that the wholesalers were agents, that these exclusive agencies were necessary
in order to carry out the company's selling plan of distribution through school
boys who required special superintendence, and that only a limited number of
dealers were affected. See Kales, Restraint of Trade (1918) sec. 156. In the
second case it was clear to the Court that the defendants held a preponderating
position in the field and intended to use the power of their combination to
exclude others from competition. See Kales, op. cit. secs. 130-136.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUNSTROKE NOT A HAZARD CONNECTED WITH
EMPLOYMENT.-The deceased, after having worked for a day and a half of
extreme heat, suffered a sunstroke which resulted in his death. Suit was brought
under an act providing for compensation for injuries proximately caused by
accident. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the hazard was not peculiar to
the employment. Lewis v. rnd. Comm. (1922, Wis.) 19o N. W. 1oi.
The instant case is entirely out of harmony with the spirit of the workmen's
compensation acts, and seems impervious to state precedents. See Ellingson
Lumber Co. v. Ind. Comm. (1918) 168 Wis. 227, 169 N. W. 568; Radtke v.
Ind. Comm. (1921) 174 Wis. 212, 183 N. W. 168; Gilliland v. Edgar Zinc
Co. (1922, Kan.) 209 Pac. 658; (1920) 30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, i90. For cases
which include sunstroke as "accidental means" in insurance policies, see (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 562.
